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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
MATTHEW BOWMAN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20060087-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
* * * 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a probation revocation proceeding in which the 
underlying crime was distribution of a controlled substance, a second degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (2003). This Court has jurisdiction 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Issue 1: Did defendant waive his limited due process and statutory rights to 
counsel at his provation revocation hearing when he failed to produce counsel on 
four occasions? 
Standard of Review. "We review whether the right to counsel has been 
properly waived for correctness, but grant the trial court a reasonable measure of 
4 
discretion when applying the law to the facts/' State v. Byington, 936 P.2d 1112,1115 
(Utah App. 1997). 
Issue 2: Did defendant receive sufficient notice of his hearing when the trial 
court served him with notice in compliance with the specific statute governing 
probation revocation proceedings? 
Standard of Review. This issue is unpreserved. Thus, no standard of review 
applies. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
This appeal concerns the limited due process right to counsel at a probation 
revocation hearing. The following sources are reproduced at Addendum A: 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV; 
Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1; 
Rule 1, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
Rule 5, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
Rule 81, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
Rule 32.1, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS1 
The State charged defendant with two counts of distributing a controlled 
substance (methamphetamine) within 1000 feet of a school, church, public park, or 
shopping mall (R44.1; R46.1). Defendant pled guilty to both counts (R44.13-22; 
R46.13-22). On August 5,2004, the district court imposed sentence, but suspended 
prison terms and put defendant on probation for thirty-six months (R44.23-25; R46. 
23-25). During the criminal proceedings, defendant was represented by counsel 
(R44.15; R46.15). 
First Order to Show Cause 
On October 13,2004, the State filed a motion for an order to show cause with 
an affidavit alleging that defendant had violated the terms of his probation (R44.27-
29; R46.27-29). Defendant appeared in court with his attorney, and admitted two of 
the allegations (R44.46; R46.47). On May 26,2005, the court ordered the term of his 
probation to restart (R44.46; R46.47). The affidavits in support of the order to show 
cause and the court's Notice of Entry of Order stated that defendant's attorney was 
D. Bruce Oliver (R44.28, R46. 28). 
1
 This appeal arises from two separate criminal cases in Carbon County: 
041700044 and 041700046. The cases present identical issues and were consolidated 
for appeal. They share transcripts but have different pleadings files. The State will 
refer to the pleadings files by the last two digits of the respective cases numbers; e.g. 
(R46.1) refers to page one of the pleadings file in case number 041700046. The State 
will refer to the transcripts according to their assigned record number; e.g. (R. 72:1). 
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Second Order to Show Cause 
December 9 - "[T]ry to get in touch with your attorney/' On November 21, 
2005, the State filed a motion for a second order to show cause, a motion for an 
arrest warrant, and an affidavit alleging that defendant had again violated the terms 
of his probation (R44.49-54; R46.50-55). The affidavit alleged five violations (R44. 
51,54; R46.52,55). Defendant was arrested on December 6 (R. 72:9). On December 
9,2005, defendant appeared in court (R. 69; R44. 57; R46. 58). The court informed 
defendant of the allegations and of his right to an attorney (R. 69:2-3). Defendant 
stated that he had his own attorney and that he had been trying to contact him (R. 
67:3). The court set a hearing for December 12, 2005, to meet with defendant's 
attorney and schedule a hearing date on his probation violations (R. 67:3). The court 
admonished defendant, "[U]se your best efforts between now and then to try and 
get in touch with your attorney; and if you get in touch with him, let him know that 
you have to be in Court on this coming Monday" (R. 67:3). 
December 12 - "[Y]ou need to get word to your attorney/' On December 12, 
2005, defendant appeared in court without counsel (R. 70). He stated that he had 
spoken to Mr. Oliver that morning and that Mr. Oliver was going to represent him 
(R. 70:3). The court noted that it not yet received a notice of appearance from Mr. 
Oliver (R. 70:6). It set another hearing for December 14,2006, and told defendant, 
"[Y]ou need to get word to your attorney that he needs to be here on the 14th/' (R. 
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70:6). The court suggested that if Mr. Oliver was unable to come, defendant should 
"get some days for a hearing from him so that we can schedule a hearing quick as 
we can, try to get you released for the holidays/7 (R. 70:6). 
December 14 - "[H]e hasn't made it here... I'm not sure what's going on." 
On December 14,2005, defendant appeared in court by video and without counsel 
(R. 71). He stated that he had told Mr. Oliver about the hearing but that "he hasn't 
made it here. I'm not sure what's going on." (R. 71:5). The court set the matter for a 
hearing on December 20,2005, and defendant told the court that he would contact 
Mr. Oliver immediately after court (R. 71:5). 
December 20 - "He's supposed to be here." On December 20, 2005, 
defendant again appeared in court - without counsel - for hearings on his order to 
show cause. (R. 72:3). The court asked defendant, "Do you have a lawyer?" (R. 
72:3). Defendant responded, "He's supposed to be here." (R. 72:3). The prosecutor 
indicated that although Mr. Oliver had attempted to call him before the December 
14 hearing, he had not yet called back (R. 72:3). However, he informed the court 
that his office had faxed Mr. Oliver the order to show cause pleadings (R. 72:3). The 
prosecutor also told the court that "from what Mrs. Bowman [defendant's mother] 
told me, Mr. Oliver's apparently at some other Court proceeding," and added, "but 
I haven't seen a motion to continue. I haven't received an appearance of counsel." 
(R. 72:3-4). The Court agreed that Mr. Oliver had not made his appearance of 
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counsel, and that there was "nothing to indicate that Mr. Oliver's in this case at all/' 
(R. 72:4). 
The Court found that defendant had been advised of his right to counsel on 
December 9, and found that defendant had waived his right to counsel "by failing to 
retain Counsel/' and informed defendant that they were "going to go ahead today." 
(R. 72:4). Defendant did not object or express concern over this finding or over 
proceeding without Mr. Oliver. 
Defendant "went fugitive" 
Agent Jeff Wood testified that defendant had signed a standard probation 
agreement (R. 72:7). He noted that AP&P had added special conditions since 
defendant's last probation violation, including a curfew and participation in a sixty -
day monitoring program (R. 72:7-8). Agent Wood explained that sometime in 
October defendant "went fugitive," meaning that "[h]e left his residence and 
[AP&P] couldn't find him." (R. 72:8). Defendant continuously failed to report to 
AP&P (R. 72:9). After securing a warrant for defendant's arrest, Agent Woods 
found defendant on December 6 and arrested him (R. 72:9). Defendant's 
employment had been terminated, and he had not established a new residence (R. 
72:10). Defendant was offered the opportunity, but declined, to cross-examine 
Agent Wood (R. 72:10). 
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Defendant did not present any evidence in his defense. He explained, "I 
didn't have the chance to contact anybody to be here with any evidence, because I 
thought my lawyer was going to be here/' (R. 72:11). The court found that "even by 
the higher standard of beyond a reasonable doubt, the allegations ha[d] been 
proven, and that the defendant ha[d] violated his terms of probation/7 (R. 72:11-12). 
The court also reminded defendant that he had been "on notice since at least the 9th 
of December that this hearing was coming up and that you had the right to counsel. 
You informed the Court at that time that you intended to hire Mr. Oliver/' (R. 
72:14). 
The prosecutor and AP&P recommended "significant jail time and a 
restarting of the probation." (R. 72:13). After defendant expressed his uncertainty 
over what to do, the court explained the prosecution's recommendation, and asked 
defendant to inform the court why his probation should not be revoked (R. 72:14). 
Defendant explained that he had participated in a program called "Group" for 
ninety days, and that a facilitator of that group had told him that he did not need to 
stay because the standard length of an IOP [Intensive Outpatient Program] was 
three months (R. 72:15). Defendant explained that the facilitator, Nannette, had 
promised to contact Agent Wood to tell him of the development (R. 72:15). 
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The court revoked defendant's probation and ordered defendant to serve his 
original sentence of two concurrent terms of one to fifteen years in prison (R. 72:17; 
R44. 60-61; R46. 59-60). Defendant timely appealed (R44. 64; R46. 63). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant was not denied a Sixth Amendment right to counsel when the 
court proceeded with his probation revocation hearing without counsel, because the 
Sixth Amendment does not apply to revocation hearings. Probationers have a 
limited due process right to counsel under certain circumstances and a statutory 
right to counsel under Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12). Defendant waived his right to 
counsel when he failed to bring counsel to his hearings on four occasions. Although 
defendant told the court that he had retained counsel, counsel did not file a notice of 
appearance or appear in court to represent defendant. The court cannot be expected 
to perpetually continue hearings because counsel has not arrived. 
Defendant's argument that he was denied due process because the court did 
not follow Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 5 and 81(e) is unpreserved and lacks merit. 
Defendant has neither cited to the record where the issue was preserved, nor alleged 
plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel. Even on the merits, defendant's 
claim fails. A specific statute governs notice in probation revocation hearings, and 
trumps the general rule. Defendant received due process when he was served with 
his arrest warrant in compliance with Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12). 
11 
ARGUMENT 
L DEFENDANT'S BRIEF IS INADEQUATE. 
Defendant asks this court to vacate the district court's revocation of his 
probation because the court did not provide "a complete court" and deprived 
defendant of his right to counsel (Br. Aplt. at 13-14). He also asserts that the district 
court violated his right to due process because the court and State did not comply -
with the notice requirements of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 5, as applicable by 
Rule 81(e). Id. at 22. Defendant's arguments are misplaced and have no application 
to the issues presented by his case. The proceeding at issue was not a part of his 
criminal prosecution, but a probation revocation hearing. 
This Court has consistently required strict compliance with Rule 24, Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, when considering arguments. Under Rule 24, an 
appellant must submit a brief containing "reasoned analysis based upon relevant 
legal authority." State v. Sloan, 2003 UT App 170, % 13, 72 P.3d 138. "An issue is 
inadequately briefed when the overall analysis of the issue is so lacking as to shift 
the burden of research and argument to the reviewing court." Id. When a 
defendant's brief "fails to cite relevant authority or provide any meaningful 
analysis" regarding the issue presented, "[tjhis court has routinely declined to 
consider arguments which are not adequately briefed on appeal." State v. Shepherd, 
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1999 UT App 305, ^ 27,989 P.2d 503 (citing Burns v. Summerhays, 927 P.2d 197,199 
(Utah App. 1996)). 
Defendant has not cited a single case relevant to the issue before the court. 
He fails to recognize the distinction between probation revocation hearings and 
criminal proceedings. He fails to cite Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), a case 
that has controlled the question for over three decades. He fails to cite State v. 
Byington, 936 P.2d 1112 (Utah App. 1997), a Utah case that directly considers the 
issue. Nor has he recognized the statutory right to counsel established by Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (12) (c)(iii), as discussed in Byington. 
Defendant's failure to cite controlling authority is fatal to his claims. See Lieber 
v. ITT Hartford Ins. Center, Inc., 2000 UT 90, % 17,15 P.3d 1030 (rejecting claims as 
"without merit" where litigant "did not even cite . . . established precedent"). 
Because defendant "fails to cite relevant authority, or provide any meaningful 
analysis" of that authority, this Court should apply its practice of "routinely 
declin[ing] to consider arguments which are not adequately briefed." Shepherd, 1999 
UT App 305, % 27. The briefs inadequacies have "shift[ed] the burden of research 
and argument onto the reviewing court" and the State. Sloan, 2003 UT App 170, f^ 
13. Therefore, this Court should decline to consider defendant's arguments. 
However, even if reviewed, defendant's claims do not entitle him to appellate relief. 
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II. PROBATION REVOCATION HEARINGS ARE "CIVIL IN 
NATURE" AND THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL DOES NOT APPLY, 
Defendant asks this Court to reverse the district court's revocation of 
probation because the court proceeded with the hearing in counsel's absence (Br. 
Aplt. at 19). He asserts that the district court erred by "chipping away and away 
[defendant's] right to a meaningful hearing by "taking [] his plea without counsel/' 
"conducting a trial without counsel," and "sentencing the defendant to prison 
without counsel." (Br. Aplt. at 19). However, the trial court did not proceed 
without defense counsel in any of these situations. Defendant was represented by 
defense counsel at his change of plea and sentencing hearings, and never went to 
trial. See (R44. 20; R46. 20) (counsel's signature on guilty plea form) ; (R44. 23; 
R46.23) (sentencing hearing); (R44.15; R46.15) (waiving jury trial). The hearing at 
issue in this case was a probation revocation proceeding, not a criminal trial. 
A. Revocation hearings are "civil in nature" and "entirely 
independent of any related criminal proceeding/' 
Defendant argues that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel guarantees 
defendant representation at his probation revocation hearing (Br. Aplt at 13,16-19). 
In support of his argument, he cites well-established case law governing the right to 
counsel during critical phases of criminal proceedings. Id. However, a probation 
revocation hearing is not a critical phase of a criminal prosecution. Indeed, it is not 
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a part of a criminal prosecution at all. It is well settled that probation revocation 
hearings are "civil in nature" and that fewer due process rights attach during these 
proceedings. State v. Hudecek, 965 P.2d 1069,1071 (Utah App. 1998). 
Utah courts, when dealing with "the question of revocation of probation," 
have long indicated that "when a person has been found guilty of an offense and 
sentenced, he is in quite a different status than he is before conviction." Velasquez v. 
Pratt, 443 P.2d 1020,1021 (Utah 1968). A probation revocation hearing is "not a 
criminal prosecution," State v. Bonza, 150 P.2d 970, 972 (Utah 1944), but is "civil in 
nature." Hudecek, 965 P.2d at 1071. "Such proceedings are 'entirely independent of 
any related criminal proceeding.'" Id. (quoting Peterson v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 907 
P.2d 1148,1154 (Utah 1995)). 
B. The Sixth Amendment does not apply to probation revocation 
hearings. 
When a convicted defendant enters into a probation agreement, he enters into 
"essentially a contract with the court: the court agrees to stay part or all of the 
statutory sentence, and the probationer in turn agrees to perform or abstain from 
performing certain acts." State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270,278 (Utah App. 1990). Like a 
parole revocation hearing, "[different burdens of proof and different procedural 
rules apply." Peterson, 907 P.2d at 1154. 
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Defendant's criminal prosecution ended on August 5,2004, when his sentence 
was imposed and suspended (R44. 23-25; R46. 23-25). His probation revocation 
hearing, which was "entirely independent of any related criminal proceedings/7 
took place on December 20,2005 (R. 72). 
Defendant claims that under Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), and its 
progeny, the district court erred by proceeding with the probation revocation 
hearing in counsel's absence (Br. Aplt. at 16-18). By its plain language, the Sixth 
Amendment does not apply except "[i]n all criminal prosecutions." U.S. Const, 
amend. VI. Because a revocation hearing is civil in nature, and is therefore not a 
critical phase of a criminal prosecution, the Sixth Amendment does not apply. 
Defendant's failure to recognize the distinction between probation revocation 
hearings and criminal proceedings renders most of his analysis irrelevant. 
1. Due Process and fundamental fairness require counsel at 
revocation hearings only under certain circumstances. 
The Supreme Court considered whether the Constitution required counsel at 
probation revocation hearings in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973). It noted 
that the presence of defense counsel at such hearings would "alter significantly the 
nature of the proceeding." Id. at 787. It distinguished probation revocation hearings 
from other criminal proceedings:" [W]e deal here, not with the right of an accused to 
counsel in a criminal prosecution, but with the more limited due process right of 
16 
one who is a probationer or parolee only because he has been convicted of a crime/7 
Id. at 789. 
The Supreme Court recently emphasized this distinction, explaining "that the 
Sixth Amendment inquiry trains on the stage of the proceedings corresponding to 
[defendant's] Circuit Court trial, where his guilt was adjudicated, eligibility for 
imprisonment established, and prison sentence determined/7 Alabama v. Shelton, 535 
U.S. 654, 665 (2002); see also Middendorfv. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 35 (1976) ("[T]he fact 
that the outcome of a proceeding may result in loss of liberty does not by itself... 
mean that the Sixth Amendments guarantee of counsel is applicable/7) (citing and 
examining Gagnon, 411 U.S. 778 (1973)). 
Whatever right to counsel a defendant may have in a civil probation 
revocation hearing is protected by notions of due process, not the Sixth 
Amendment. Gagnon recognized that due process - not the Sixth Amendment -
may require counsel in certain cases.2 It rejected a claim that due process mandated 
counsel for every probation revocation hearing, and instead determined that "the 
2
 Although the Court was only considering the right to appointed counsel by 
indigent probationers, Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 783 n.6, the same rules should apply to 
non-indigent probationers. See e.g., State v. Schmidt, 215 N.W.2d 361,367 (Wis. 1974) 
("We are unable to discern any valid reason why retained counsel should always be 
permitted to participate in hearings whereas representation of an indigent would be 
subject to the rule of [Gagnon] It is our opinion that if we were to sanction such 
a result, it would be violative of the equal protection clause . . . . " ) . 
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decision as to the need for counsel must be made on a case-by-case basis in the 
exercise of sound discretion by the state authority charged with responsibility for 
administering the probation and parole system/7 Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 790. 
The Court explained that "the presence and participation of counsel will 
probably be both undesirable and constitutionally unnecessary in most revocation 
hearings/' but in "certain cases . . . fundamental fairness - the touchstone of due 
process - will require that the State provide at its expense counsel for indigent 
probationers or parolees." Id. 
2. Defendant has not presented a claim upon which this Court 
may grant relief. 
Defendant cites solely to Sixth Amendment jurisprudence when he asks this 
Court for appellate relief. See (Br. Aplt. at 13-20). Because the Sixth Amendment 
does not apply at probation revocation proceedings, defendant is not entitled to 
relief. See State v. Weaver, 2005 UT 49, Tf 19,122 P.3d 566 (refusing to address plain 
error argument raised in reply brief because appellant must "articulate the 
justification for review in [his] opening brief"). This Court should reject defendant's 
claims. See Brigham City v. Stuart, 2005 UT 13, % 14,122 P.3d 506, rev'd on other 
grounds by 126 S. Ct. 1943 (2006) (explaining that Utah's courts are "resolute in 
[their] refusal to take up constitutional issues which have not been properly 
preserved, framed and briefed"). 
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However, even if defendant had raised his claims under controlling law, he 
would not be entitled to appellate relief. 
3. Probationers have only a "limited due process right" to 
counsel at revocation hearings. 
Defendant could have - but has not - claimed that the court violated his 
limited due process rights to counsel. The Supreme Court declined to "formulate a 
precise and detailed set of guidelines" for judges to consider when deciding 
whether to appoint counsel. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 790. However, it presumed that 
counsel should be provided in cases where the following conditions were met: (1) 
when a probationer is informed of his right to counsel; and (2) makes a request for 
counsel "based on a timely and colorable claim (i) that he has not committed the 
alleged violation . . . ; or (ii) that, even if the violation is . . . uncontested, there are 
substantial reasons which justified or mitigated the violation and make revocation 
inappropriate, and that the reasons are complex or otherwise difficult to develop or 
present." Id. In a later decision, the Court explained that due process only requires 
counsel "whenever the complexity of fact issues so warrant." Pennsylvania Bd. of 
Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357,377 (1998). 
This Court has applied Gagnon to probation revocation hearings in Utah. In 
State v. Byington, this Court recognized that the Utah Supreme Court "[s]imilarly... 
noted that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not apply, although due 
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process may apply depending on the circumstances/' Byington, 936 P.2d 1112,1116 
(Utah App. 1997) (citing Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017,1029 (Utah 1996) (plurality 
opinion)). 
Byington held that the defendant did not have a constitutional right to counsel 
because he "did not contest the alleged probation violations, nor did he present any 
argument regarding why his probation should not have been revoked/7 Id. It held 
that "under the circumstances of this case, Byington was not constitutionally 
entitled to counsel at the probation revocation hearing." Id. 
In this case, the due process right to counsel may have applied, unless the 
"complexity of the fact issues" did not warrant the presence of counsel. However, 
whether defendant had a due process right to counsel is ultimately moot, because 
defendant failed to brief a due process claim, and because defendant validly waived 
his limited due process right to counsel. See infra Section III. 
4. Probationers also have a statutory right to counsel at 
revocation hearings. 
Defendant could have - but has not - claimed that the court improperly 
allowed defendant to waive his statutory right to counsel, established by Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-18-1 (12)(iii) (addendum A). In State v. Byington, 936 P.2d 1112 (Utah App. 
1997), this Court separated the limited due process right to counsel from the 
statutory right to counsel. Byington, 936 P.2d at 1116. However, statutory rights 
20 
provide less protection than constitutional rights. See id. Thus, even if defendant 
had raised this claim, he would not be entitled to appellate relief. 
III. DEFENDANT WAIVED BOTH HIS DUE PROCESS AND 
STATUTORY RIGHTS TO COUNSEL BY FAILING TO 
PRODUCE HIS ATTORNEY AT FOUR HEARINGS. 
Although Due Process and statute may provide probationers with the right to 
counsel in revocation hearings, both may be properly waived. In this case, 
defendant waived his right to counsel by failing to bring counsel with him to four 
revocation hearings. 
A. This Court should look at the totality of the circumstances to 
determine waiver of the due process right to counsel. 
The amount of process due a probationer who is waiving the "limited due 
process right" to counsel is limited. See Morrisey, 408 U.S. at 480 (explaining that 
"the full panoply of rights due a defendant in [a criminal] proceeding does not 
apply to parole revocations") (citation omitted). No controlling case law has 
announced the standard by which this Court should measure the adequacy of a 
waiver of the limited right to counsel at a revocation hearing. However, this Court 
has noted that it will "decline to establish bright line rules for determining the 
proper waiver" of constitutional and statutory rights to counsel. Byington, 936 P.2d 
at 1117 (citing Frampton, 737 P.2d at 188). 
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Byington held that the probationer was not entitled to counsel under the Due 
Process clause. 936 P.2d at 1116. Dictum in Byington seems to suggest the Frampton 
standard for determining whether waiver of counsel was voluntary. However, 
Frampton dealt with the right to counsel guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment, 
while this case only considers the "more limited due process right" to counsel 
granted to some defendants under the due process clause. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 789; 
see Frampton, 737 R2d at 187. 
Because probationers in revocation hearings have fewer due process rights 
than defendants in criminal proceedings, a court accepting a waiver of hearing 
counsel should not be held to the same requirements as a court accepting waiver of 
trial counsel. Thus, a full Frampton colloquy should not be required at a probation 
revocation hearing. Imposing the same protections warranted by the Sixth 
Amendment to the due process right to counsel would effectively extend the Sixth 
Amendment to probation revocation proceedings. The Supreme Court has 
consistently held that this is not required by the Constitution. See Gagnon v. 
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 789 (1973); Middendorfv. Henry, 425 U.S. 25,35 (1976). 
This Court should apply the same standard that applies to the statutory right 
to counsel, where waiver is "proper as long as the record as a whole reflects the 
probationer's reasonable understanding of the proceedings and awareness of the 
right to counsel." Byington, 936 P.2d at 1117 (citations omitted). "[T]his lower 
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standard will turn 'upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding each 
case/" Id. (quoting Frampton, 737 P.2d at 188). 
Other jurisdictions are split on this issue. Some have applied a "totality of the 
circumstances" standard for waiving counsel at a revocation hearing. A recent Fifth 
Circuit case held that a defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to 
counsel, even in the absence of a colloquy by the district court. See United States v. 
Hodges, 460 F.3d 646, 652-53 (5th Cir. 2006). The court acknowledged that Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(b) had been promulgated in order to protect the 
limited due process right recognized in Morrissey and Gagnon. Id. at 651. However, 
although Rule 32.1(b) helped to "clarify the specific rights and procedural 
safeguards due a defendant at the revocation juncture, it [left] open the question of 
the appropriate standard by which to measure a defendant's waiver of the Rule's 
protections." Id. The court agreed with several other circuits that the waiver of that 
right must be "knowing and voluntary," and "declined to require rigid or specific 
colloquies with the district court, adopting instead a 'totality of the circumstances' 
standard." Id. 
Hodges explained that "such waivers need not be accompanied either by any 
magic words or by a formal colloquy of the depth and intensity required under 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11." Id. at 652 (quoting United States v. Correa-
Torres, ?>2<o F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 2003)). The "totality of the circumstances" test 
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proved "appropriate for the more informal, non-jury proceeding/7 Id. at 652. 
Although a colloquy would suffice to prove a knowing waiver, "where the colloquy 
leaves some uncertainty, the totality of the circumstances assures that the waiver is 
knowing and voluntary/7 Id. 
Many other jurisdictions have held similarly. See e.g., Correa-Torres, 326 F.3d 
at 23; United States v. LeBlanc, 175 F.3d 511,515 (7th Cir. 1999); People v. Belanger, 576 
N.W.2d 703, 708 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (declining to extend full procedural 
safeguards to revocation proceedings); see also United States v. Rapert, 813 F.2d 182, 
184 (8th Cir. 1987) (noting that no federal jurisdiction has required Rule 11 colloquy 
at revocation hearing, and collecting cases). Conversely, some jurisdictions have 
applied full procedural safeguards to revocation proceedings. See e.g., Savage v. 
State, 581 So.2d 205 (Fla. Ct. App. 1991); Huckaby v. State, 408 S.E.2d 242 (S.C. 1991); 
People v. Hall, 267 Cal.Rptr. 494 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); State v. Warren, 345 S.E.2d 437 
(N.C. App. 1986). 
Defendant's case is similar to Hodges and other cases applying the "totality of 
the circumstances" test. The statute promulgated to protect the limited due process 
rights of Utah probationers is substantially similar to the federal rule. Compare Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12) (West 2004) (addendum A) with Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 32.1(b) (addendum A). 
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This Court has applied a totality of the circumstances test when considering 
the statutory right to counsel created by Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12). See Byington, 
936 P.2d at 1117. Applying the same test to the limited due process right to counsel 
at revocation hearings would provide appropriate protection for defendants in this 
informal, civil proceeding, while allowing the district court sufficient discretion to 
determine whether the defendant has waived his right to counsel at the hearing. 
B. Under the totality of the circumstances, defendant waived his 
limited due process right to counseL 
Although jurisdictions are split over the level of warning that a court must 
give a probationer, it is generally accepted that a waiver of the due process right to 
counsel must be knowing and voluntary. See United States v. Hodges, 460 F.3d 646, 
652-53 (5th Cir. 2006) (collecting federal cases); People v. Belanger, 576 N. W.2d 703, 
708 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (looking for knowing and voluntary waiver through 
totality of circumstances). In this case, defendant knowingly and voluntarily 
waived his right to counsel. 
Relying on his argument that he was denied the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel, defendant cites State v. Pedockie, 2006 UT 28,137 P.3d 716, and argues that 
because the trial court did not explicitly warn defendant of the dangers of self-
representation, defendant did not waive his right to counsel by his conduct. See Br. 
Appellant, at 15. 
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In Pedockie, the Utah Supreme Court considered the requirements that a trial 
court must meet before finding that a defendant had impliedly waived his right to 
trial counsel through dilatory conduct. Pedockie, 2006 UT 28, \ \ 33-39. Pedockie 
recommended that the trial court engage in a colloquy with a defendant when 
dilatory conduct could lead to an implied waiver of counsel. Id. at \ 39. However, 
the strict requirements of Pedockie were not formulated to protect the "limited due 
process right" at issue in this case, but were intended to protect the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel in a criminal prosecution. See Pedockie, 2006 UT 28, ^ 
25. Because defendant had no Sixth Amendment right to counsel at his probation 
revocation hearing, the Pedockie standard is not applicable. Imposing Pedockie's 
requirement upon the court when dealing with the Due Process right to counsel in 
an informal, civil revocation hearing would be unduly burdensome. 
Instead of requiring the district court to "explain the consequences of a 
decision to proceed pro se," Id. at *[  38, this Court should instead look to the totality 
of the circumstances to determine if defendant "possessed an awareness of the 
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation" and was "warned that 
continuation of the unacceptable conduct [would] result in a waiver of the right to 
counsel." Id. at \ 33. 
Under the totality of the circumstances, defendant was aware of the dangers 
and disadvantages of self-representation. This was his second probation revocation 
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hearing, and he had previously been guided through a hearing by counsel (R44.46; 
R46.47). He was repeatedly told he could bring an attorney to his hearing (R. 67:3; 
70:6; 71:5). He was incarcerated, and knew that if his probation was revoked he 
could be sent to prison. See (R44. 54, 56 ; R46. 55, 57) (recommendation by AP&P 
that defendant be committed to prison). Under the totality of the circumstances, 
defendant was aware that self-representation could result in his incarceration. 
Under the totality of the circumstances, defendant's waiver was also 
voluntary. The court repeatedly told defendant that he needed to bring counsel to 
his hearings or find dates at which counsel could attend (R. 67:3; 70:6; 71:5). 
Defendant was aware that the court could not appoint an attorney because he was 
not indigent (R. 69:3). Despite these admonitions, defendant appeared at court 
without counsel on four consecutive occasions (R. 67; R. 70; R. 71; R. 72). Under the 
totality of the circumstances, defendant must have understood that the court would 
not indefinitely grant continuances because his counsel failed to arrive. 
Although defendant may not have purposefully relinquished his limited right 
to counsel, his failure to bring counsel to the hearing on four occasions demonstrates 
a knowing and voluntary waiver of that right. Even a defendant with a Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel "need not intend to relinquish the right to counsel/7 
Pedockie, 2006 UT 28, % 33. Because the totality of the circumstances demonstrate 
that defendant was aware of the dangers of self-representation and knew that the 
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failure to bring counsel to his hearings would result in a waiver of his right to 
counsel, any claim that the trial court denied defendant his due process right to 
counsel would fail. 
C Defendant also waived his statutory right to counsel. 
Defendant could have - but has not - claimed that the court improperly 
allowed defendant to waive his statutory right to counsel, established by Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-18-l(12)(iii) (addendum A). In State v. Byington, 936 P.2d 1112 (Utah App. 
1997), this Court separated the limited due process right to counsel from the 
statutory right to counsel enunciated in subsection (12). Byington, 936 P.2d at 1116. 
Byington held that "the strict Frampton standards" were inapplicable "where 
the right to counsel is provided for by statute because procedural rights do not 
generally warrant the same protections as do constitutional rights." Id. Instead, it 
held that "waiver of a statutory right to counsel is proper as long as the record as a 
whole reflects the probationer's reasonable understanding of the proceedings and 
awareness of the right to counsel." Id. at 1117 (citing Coon v. State, 675 So.2d 94,96-
97 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995); People v. Clark, 510 N.E.2d 1256,1258 (1987); Jester v. Bd. of 
Probation & Parole, 595 A.2d 748, 751 (Pa. 1991); State v. Conlin, 744 P.2d 1094,1096 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1987)). 
Byington " decline [d] to establish bright-line rules for determining the proper 
waiver of the statutory right to counsel," and instead held that "under this lower 
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standard" the determination would "turn 'upon the particular facts and 
circumstances surrounding each case/" Id. (quoting Frampton, 737 P.2d at 188). 
In Byington, this Court found waiver of the statutory right because the court 
had "informed Byington of the allegations against him, that counsel would be 
appointed if he requested, and that counsel might be able to assist him in the 
proceedings." Id. It also held that Byington "was clearly aware of his original 
sentence and thus the consequences of his probation being revoked." Id. 
Defendant properly waived his statutory right to counsel because he had a 
reasonable understanding of the proceedings and was aware of his right to counsel. 
To find a proper waiver of the statutory right to counsel, the "record as a whole" 
must "reflect[s] the probationer's reasonable understanding of the proceedings and 
awareness of the right to counsel." Byington, 936 P.2d at 1117. For the same reasons 
that defendant's waiver of his due process right to counsel was knowing and 
voluntary, see supra, section 111(C)(2), defendant also validly waived his statutory 
right to counsel. 
IV. ANY ERROR WAS HARMLESS. 
Defendant claims that "prejudice such as in this matter is presumed." (Br. 
Aplt. at 20). However, this statement is premised upon a denial of the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel, which is not at issue in this case. Denial of the Sixth 
Amendment right to trial counsel constitutes structural error and mandates reversal 
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without review for harmlessness. See e.g., United States v. Gonzales-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 
2557, 2559 (2006). 
This case involves the limited due process right to counsel at a revocation 
hearing, not a Sixth Amendment violation. Defendant has not cited any case 
holding that denial of the limited due process right to counsel is structural error. 
Nor has any court so held. Any error that is not structural is generally subject to 
harmless error analysis. Washington v. Recuenco, 126 S. Ct. 2546, 2551 (2006) ("We 
have repeatedly recognized that the commission of a constitutional error at trial 
alone does not entitle a defendant to automatic reversal. Instead, ""most 
constitutional errors can be harmless/"") (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 
8 (1999)) (additional citation omitted). 
In this case, the trial court properly decided to proceed without counsel. Even 
if this decision was error, it was harmless. The allegations against defendant were 
grave. This was defendant's second probation violation (R44. 46; R46. 47). After 
agreeing to participate in a treatment program, and beginning to participate, 
defendant "never completed the program; and was in IOP [the intensive outpatient 
program] when he went fugitive/7 (R. 72:8). He stopped reporting to his probation 
officer: "He didn't report. He had quit his job. He left his residence. He was 
nowhere to be found." (R. 72:8). Defendant did not tell his mother where he had 
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gone (R. 72:8-9). For nearly a month, defendant violated his probation by avoiding 
his probation officers until his arrest (R. 72:9). 
Even with the assistance of counsel, defendant would not have been granted 
probation. Although defendant explained that he had participated in a program 
similar to IOP, he was in direct violation of his probation in several respects. Thus, 
the trial court's finding that defendant had waived his limited right to counsel 
through his conduct, if error, was harmless. This Court "will not reverse a trial 
court for committing harmless error." State v. Vargas, 2001 UT 5, ^ 48, 20 P.3d 271 
(quotations and citation omitted). 
V, DEFENDANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO NOTICE WAS 
NOT VIOLATED WHEN THE TRIAL COURT FOLLOWED 
THE PROCEDURE MANDATED BY STATUTE 
Defendant claims that the trial court violated his due process rights "because 
neither [defendant nor] counsel received adequate notice." (Br. Aplt. at 21) 
(boldface and capitalization omitted). He claims that because the court did not 
comply with Rules 5 and 81(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, he was denied 
due process. Id. at 22-23. Defendant's unpreserved argument lacks merit. 
A. Defendant's argument is unpreserved. 
Defendant asks this court to reverse the trial court because it failed to send 
notice of defendant's probation revocation hearing to counsel, pursuant to Rules 5 
and 81(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Br. Aplt. at 22-23). He does not reference 
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where in the record this issue was preserved. Nor could he. Defendant did not 
present this issue to the court below, and has not argued plain error or exceptional 
circumstances. 
It is well settled that "[a] general rule of appellate review in criminal cases in 
Utah is that a contemporaneous objection or some form of specific preservation of 
claims of error must be made a part of the trial court record before an appellate 
court will review such claim on appeal/7 State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 
1987). '" [Ujnder ordinary circumstances, we will not consider an issue brought for 
the first time on appeal unless the trial court committed plain error or [unless] 
exceptional circumstances [exist]/" State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, ^ 23,128 P.3d 1171 
(quoting State v. Finder, 2005 UT 15, \ 45,114 P.3d 551). If a defendant "does not 
argue that 'exceptional circumstances' or 'plain error' justifies review of the issue, 
we decline to consider it on appeal" State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226,1229 n.5 (Utah 
1995). 
In this case, defendant did not preserve his claim below. Defendant did not 
bring this issue to the trial court's attention, either by oral or written motion. He 
never complained about the adequacy of notice. Therefore, defendant's claim is 
unpreserved. In his opening brief, defendant does not allege plain error, 
exceptional circumstances or ineffective assistance of counsel. See Winfield, 2006 
UT 4 at \ 23 ("Because [defendant] argued neither plain error nor exceptional 
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circumstances in his brief on appeal, review is available only if the issue was 
adequately preserved/'). This Court should deny review of this claim. 
B. Defendant's limited due process rights were not violated. 
Even if defendant had preserved his claim, it lacks merit. Although 
probationers are entitled to due process under the United States Constitution, the 
process to which they are entitled is limited. The Supreme Court established the 
minimum requirements of due process in parole hearings mMorrissey v. Brewer, 408 
U.S. 471 (1972), and extended those requirements to probation revocation hearings 
in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973) (holding that a "probationer, like a 
parolee, is entitled to a preliminary and final revocation hearing, under the 
conditions specified mMorrissey"). 
"[T]he revocation of parole is not part of a criminal prosecution and thus the 
full panoply of rights due a defendant in such a proceeding does not apply to parole 
revocations/7 Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480 (citation omitted). The limited liberty 
interest provided by parole is "valuable and must be seen as within the protection of 
the Fourteenth Amendment/' Id. at 482, but "[o]nce it has been determined that due 
process applies, the question remains what process is due." Id. at 481. 
Morrisey determined that the termination of parole called "for some orderly 
process, however informal." Id. at 482. It listed the minimum requirements of 
revocation proceedings: 
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They include (a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) 
disclosure to the parolee of the evidence against him; (c) opportunity to 
be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary 
evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses 
(unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not 
allowing confrontation); (e) a 'neutral and detached" hearing body.. . ; 
and (f) written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on 
and reasons for revoking the parole. 
Id. at 489. 
These limited due process rights have been codified in Utah Code Ann. § 77-
18-1(12) (West 2004) (addendum A). See State v. Green, 757 P.2d 462,464 (Utah 1988) 
(" [T]he power to revoke probation must be exercised within legislatively established 
limits."). In this case, the district court complied with Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12). 
Defendant's due process rights were not violated. 
C A specific statute governs notice requirements for probation 
revocation hearings, rendering Rules 5 and 81(e) irrelevant. 
Defendant argues that because the court did not send written notice of the 
order to show cause hearing to defense counsel, who had neither appeared in court 
nor filed a notice of appearance, that this Court should grant him relief. Defendant 
asks this Court to "make it unequivocally clear that rule 5 and 81(e) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure apply in criminal proceedings/' (Br. Aplt. at 22). 
Defendant's request must be denied. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 5 generally governs notice in civil proceedings, 
and requires that every judgment, order, written motion, or similar paper be served 
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upon the parties of an action. Utah R. Civ. P. 5(a)(1) (addendum A). If a party is 
represented by counsel, then "service shall be made upon the attorney unless 
service upon the party is ordered by the court/' Utah R. Civ. P. 5(b)(1). Rule 81(e) 
applies the civil rules to criminal proceedings "where there is no other applicable 
statute or rule, provided, that any rule so applied does not conflict with any 
statutory or constitutional requirement." Utah R. Civ. P. 81(e) (addendum A). 
Rule 5 is inapplicable to probation revocation hearings because the legislature 
has specifically provided what notice must be given a probationer. The Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure explicitly state that "[t]hese rules shall govern the procedure in 
the courts of the state of Utah.. . except as governed by other rules promulgated by 
this court or enacted by the Legislature/' Utah R. Civ. P. 1 (emphasis added). 
The Legislature has promulgated rules governing probation revocation 
proceedings, including notice requirements. The statute provides: "[The court] shall 
cause to be served on the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the affidavit 
and an order to show cause why his probation should not be revoked .. .." Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (12)(b)(ii) (West 2004) (addendum A). The notice requirements 
of Rule 5 do not apply because they conflict with this statute. Likewise, Rule 81(e) is 
irrelevant to this matter, because the probation revocation hearing is not a criminal 
proceeding, but "civil in nature." Hudecek, 965 P.2d at 1071. 
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Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(12)(b)(ii), defendant was served with 
his arrest warrant when his probation officer took him into custody on December 6 
(R44. 57; R46. 58; R. 72:9). This is all the statute requires. Therefore, he received 
both adequate notice and all of the process that he was due.3 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court 
affirm the district court's revocation of defendant's probation. 
Respectfully submitted November *C , 2006. 
MARKL.SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
ERIN RILEY 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
3
 Even if Rule 5 applied, the court found that there was "nothing to indicate 
that Mr. Oliver [was] in this case at all/7 R. 72:4. Defense counsel did not appear in 
court on this matter and never filed a notice of appearance. R. 72:4. Rule 5 does not 
require the court to serve notice on an attorney who has not entered the case. 
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U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. XIV-Full Text 
C 
United States Code Annotated Currentness 
Constitution of the United States 
*! Annotated 
*i Amendment XIV. Citizenship; Privileges and Immunities; Due Process; Equal Protection; 
Apportionment of Representation; Disqualification of Officers; Public Debt; Enforcement (Refs & Annos) 
-•AMENDMENT XIV. CITIZENSHIP; PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES; DUE PROCESS; 
EQUAL PROTECTION; APPOINTMENT OF REPRESENTATION; DISQUALIFICATION OF 
OFFICERS; PUBLIC DEBT; ENFORCEMENT 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens 
of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, 
counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any 
election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in 
Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any 
of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any 
way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be 
reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens 
twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, 
or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an 
oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as 
an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged 
in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by 
a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability. 
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for 
payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. 
But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of 
insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all 
such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article. 
<Section 1 of this amendment is further displayed in separate documents according to subject matter,> 
<see USCA Const Amend. XIV, § 1-Citizens> 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 77-18-1 
c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
*i Chapter 18. The Judgment 
-•§ 77-18-1. Suspension of sentence—Pleas held in abeyance—Probation— 
Supervision—Presentence investigation—Standards—Confidentiality—Terms and 
conditions—Termination, revocation, modification, or extension—Hearings— 
Electronic monitoring 
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction with 
a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as provided 
in Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the plea in 
abeyance agreement. 
(2) (a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or conviction of 
any crime or offense, the court may, after imposing sentence, suspend the 
execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation. The court may 
place the defendant: 
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections except 
in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions; 
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a private 
organization; or 
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court. 
(b)(i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the 
department is with the department. 
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of the 
sentencing court is vested as ordered by the court. 
(iii) The court has continuing jurisdiction over all probationers. 
(3) (a) The department shall establish supervision and presentence investigation 
standards for all individuals referred to the department. These standards shall 
be based on: 
(i) the type of offense; 
(ii) the demand for services; 
(iii) the availability of agency resources; 
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(iv) the public safety; and 
(v) other criteria established by the department to determine what level of 
services shall be provided. 
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted to the 
Judicial Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an annual basis for 
review and comment prior to adoption by the department. 
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures to 
implement the supervision and investigation standards. 
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider modifications 
to the standards based upon criteria in Subsection (3) (a) and other criteria as 
they consider appropriate. 
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an impact 
report and submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations subcommittee. 
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the department is not required to 
supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or C misdemeanors or 
infractions or to conduct presentence investigation reports on class C 
misdemeanors or infractions. However, the department may supervise the probation 
of class B misdemeanants in accordance with department standards. 
(5)(a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of sentence for 
a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a presentence 
investigation report from the department or information from other sources about 
the defendant. 
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact statement 
according to guidelines set in Section 77-38a-203 describing the effect of the 
crime on the victim and the victim's family. 
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific statement of 
pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the department regarding 
the payment of restitution with interest by the defendant in accordance with 
Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act. 
(d) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any 
diagnostic evaluation report ordered by the court under Section 7 6-3-404, are 
protected and are not available except by court order for purposes of sentencing 
as provided by rule of the Judicial Council or for use by the department. 
(6) (a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report to the 
defendant's attorney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel, the 
prosecutor, and the court for review, three working days prior to sentencing. Any 
alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report, which have not been 
resolved by the parties and the department prior to sentencing, shall be brought 
to the attention of the sentencing judge, and the judge may grant an additional 
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ten working days to resolve the alleged inaccuracies of the report with the 
department. If after ten working days the inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the 
court shall make a determination of relevance and accuracy on the record. 
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence investigation 
report at the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered to be waived. 
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, or 
information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present 
concerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information 
shall be presented in open court on record and in the presence of the defendant. 
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the court may require 
that the defendant: 
(a) perform any or all of the following: 
(i) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being placed 
on probation; 
(ii) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense Costs; 
(iii) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally liable; 
(iv) participate in available treatment programs, including any treatment 
program in which the defendant is currently participating, if the program is 
acceptable to the court; 
(v) serve a period of time, not to exceed one year, in a county jail designated 
by the department, after considering any recommendation by the court as to 
which jail the court finds most appropriate; 
(vi) serve a term of home confinement, which may include the use of electronic 
monitoring; 
(vii) participate in compensatory service restitution programs, including the 
compensatory service program provided in Section 78-11-20.7; 
(viii) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment services; 
(ix) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with interest in 
accordance with Title 77, Chapter 33a, Crime Victims Restitution Act; and 
(x) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers appropriate; and 
(b) if convicted on or after May 5, 1997: 
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain a high school graduation diploma, 
a GED certificate, or a vocational certificate at the defendant's own expense 
if the defendant has not received the diploma, GED certificate, or vocational 
certificate prior to being placed on probation; or 
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(ii) provide documentation of the inability to obtain one of the items listed 
in Subsection (8)(b)(i) because of: 
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or 
(B) other justified cause. 
(9) The department shall collect and disburse the account receivable as defined by 
Section 76-3-201.1, with interest and any other costs assessed under Section 
64-13-21 during: 
(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance with 
Subsection 77-27-6(4); and 
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised probation 
and any extension of that period by the department in accordance with Subsection 
(10). 
(10) (a) (i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the court 
or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in felony or class A 
misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B or C misdemeanors or 
infractions. 
(ii)(A) If, upon expiration or termination of the probation period under 
Subsection (10) (a) (i), there remains an unpaid balance upon the account 
receivable as defined in Section 76-3-201.1, the court may retain jurisdiction 
of the case and continue the defendant on bench probation for the limited 
purpose of enforcing the payment of the account receivable. 
(B) In accordance with Section 77-18-6, the court shall record in the registry 
of civil judgments any unpaid balance not already recorded and immediately 
transfer responsibility to collect the account to the Office of State Debt 
Collection. 
(iii) Upon motion of the Office of State Debt Collection, prosecutor, victim, 
or upon its own motion, the court may require the defendant to show cause why 
his failure to pay should not be treated as contempt of court. 
(b) (i) The department shall notify the sentencing court, the Office of State Debt 
Collection, and the prosecuting attorney in writing in advance in all cases when 
termination of supervised probation will occur by law. 
(ii) The notification shall include a probation progress report and complete 
report of details on outstanding accounts receivable. 
(11) (a) (i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after having 
been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing to revoke probation 
does not constitute service of time toward the total probation term unless the 
probationer is exonerated at a hearing to revoke the probation. 
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision concerning 
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revocation of probation does not constitute service of time toward the total 
probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at the hearing. 
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a violation 
report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and conditions of 
probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or warrant by the court. 
(12) (a) (i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver of a 
hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court that the 
probationer has violated the conditions of probation. 
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court and a finding 
that the conditions of probation have been violated. 
(b) (i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts asserted 
to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the court that authorized 
probation shall determine if the affidavit establishes probable cause to believe 
that revocation, modification, or extension of probation is justified. 
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to be 
served on the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the affidavit and 
an order to show cause why his probation should not be revoked, modified, or 
extended. 
(c) (i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the hearing and 
shall be served upon the defendant at least five days prior to the hearing. 
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance. 
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right to be 
represented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel appointed for him if 
he is indigent. 
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present evidence. 
(d) (i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations of the 
affidavit. 
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the prosecuting 
attorney shall present evidence on the allegations. 
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the allegations 
are based shall be presented as witnesses subject to questioning by the 
defendant unless the court for good cause otherwise orders. 
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own behalf, and 
present evidence. 
(e)(i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact. 
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of probation, 
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the court may order the probation revoked, modified, continued, or that the 
entire probation term commence anew. 
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the sentence 
previously imposed shall be executed. 
(13) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of the 
Division of Substance Abuse and Mental Health for treatment at the Utah State 
Hospital as a condition of probation or stay of sentence, only after the 
superintendent of the Utah State Hospital or his designee has certified to the 
court that: 
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at the state 
hospital; 
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and 
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-15-610(2)(g) are receiving priority for 
treatment over the defendants described in this Subsection (13). 
(14) Presentence investigation reports, including presentence diagnostic 
evaluations, are classified protected in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 2, 
Government Records Access and Management Act. Notwithstanding Sections 63- 2-403 
and 63-2-404, the State Records Committee may not order the disclosure of a 
presentence investigation report. Except for disclosure at the time of sentencing 
pursuant to this section, the department may disclose the presentence 
investigation only when: 
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63-2-202(7); 
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by the 
department for purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of the 
offender; 
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole; 
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or the 
subject's authorized representative; or 
(e) requested by the victim of the crime discussed in the presentence 
investigation report or the victim's authorized representative, provided that the 
disclosure to the victim shall include only information relating to statements or 
materials provided by the victim, to the circumstances of the crime including 
statements by the defendant, or to the impact of the crime on the victim or the 
victim's household. 
(15) (a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of probation 
under the supervision of the department, except as provided in Sections 7 6- 3-406 
and 76-5-406.5. 
(b) The department shall establish procedures and standards for home confinement, 
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including electronic monitoring, for all individuals referred to the department 
in accordance with Subsection (16). 
(16) (a) If the court places the defendant on probation under this section, it may 
order the defendant to participate in home confinement through the use of 
electronic monitoring as described in this section until further order of the 
court. 
(b) The electronic monitoring shall alert the department and the appropriate law 
enforcement unit of the defendant's whereabouts. 
(c) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions which require: 
(i) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times; and 
(ii) that a device be placed in the home of the defendant, so that the 
defendant's compliance with the court's order may be monitored. 
(d) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home confinement through 
electronic monitoring as a condition of probation under this section, it shall: 
(i) place the defendant on probation under the supervision of the Department of 
Corrections; 
(ii) order the department to place an electronic monitoring device on the 
defendant and install electronic monitoring equipment in the residence of the 
defendant; and 
(iii) order the defendant to pay the costs associated with home confinement to 
the department or the program provider. 
(e) The department shall pay the costs of home confinement through electronic 
monitoring only for those persons who have been determined to be indigent by the 
court. 
(f) The department may provide the electronic monitoring described in this 
section either directly or by contract with a private provider. 
Laws 1980, c. 15, § 2; Laws 1981, c. 59, § 2; Laws 1982, c. 9, § 1; Laws 1983, 
c. 47, § 1; Laws 1983, c. 68, § 1; Laws 1983, c. 85, § 2; Laws 1984, c. 20, § 
1; Laws 1985, c. 212, § 17; Laws 3 985, c. 229, § 1; Laws 1987, c. 114, § 1; 
Laws 1989, c. 226, § 1; Laws 1990, c. 134, § 2; Laws 1991, c. 66, § 5; Laws 
1991, c. 206, § 6; Laws 1992, c. 14, § 3; Laws 1993, c. 82, § 7; Laws 1993, c. 
220, § 3; Laws 1994, c. 13, § 24; Laws 1994, c. 198, § 1; Laws 1994, c. 230, § 1; 
Laws 1995, c. 20, § 146, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, c. 117, § 2, eff. May 1, 
1995; Laws 1995, c. 184, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, c. 301, § 3, eff. May 
1, 1995; Laws 1995, c. 337, § 11, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, c. 352, § 6, eff. 
May 1, 1995; Laws 1996, c. 79, § 103, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 1997, c. 390, § 
2, eff. May 5, 1997; Laws 1998, c. 94, § 10, eff. May 4, 1998; Laws 1999, c. 
279, § 8, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 1999, c. 287, § 7, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 2001, 
c. 137, § 1, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2002, c. 35, § 7, eff. May 6, 2002; Laws 
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C 
West's Utah Court Rules Annotated Currentness 
State Court Rules 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Refs & Annos) 
*i Part I. Scope of Rules-One Form of Action 
-•RULE 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
(a) Scope of rules. These rules shall govern the procedure in the courts of the state of Utah in all actions, suits, 
and proceedings of a civil nature, whether cognizable at law or in equity, and in all special statutory proceedings, 
except as governed by other rules promulgated by this court or enacted by the Legislature and except as stated in 
Rule 81. They shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every 
action. 
(b) Effective date. These rules shall take effect on January 1, 1950; and thereafter all laws in conflict therewith 
shall be of no further force or effect. They govern all proceedings in actions brought after they take effect and also 
all further proceedings in actions then pending, except to the extent that in the opinion of the court their application 
in a particular action pending when the rules take effect would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which 
event the former procedure applies. 
(c) Electronic filing. Notwithstanding these rules, the court may permit electronic transactions among the parties 
and with the court in court-supervised pilot projects approved by the Judicial Council. 
[Amended effective January 1, 1987; November 1, 1996; November 1, 1999; April 1, 2003.] 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
These rules apply to court commissioners as the same extent as to judges. 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Arbitration in third party motor vehicle accident cases, see § 31A-22-321. 
Juvenile cases, applicability of rules, see Juv. Proc, Rule 2. 
LAW REVIEW AND JOURNAL COMMENTARIES 
Learning professionalism and civility-Thoughts for new members of the bar. Judge Derek P. Pullan , 18-AUG Utah 
B.J. 32 (2005). 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Attorney and Client €=^2. 
C.J.S. Attorney and Client §§ 6, 10. 
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*i Part II. Commencement of Action; Service of Process, Pleadings, Motions and Orders 
-•RULE 5. SERVICE AND FILING OF PLEADINGS AND OTHER PAPERS 
(a) Service: When required. 
(a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in these rules or as otherwise directed by the court, every judgment, every 
order required by its terms to be served, every pleading subsequent to the original complaint, every paper relating 
to discovery, every written motion other than one heard ex parte, and every written notice, appearance, demand, 
offer of judgment, and similar paper shall be served upon each of the parties. 
(a)(2) No service need be made on parties in default except that: 
(a)(2)(A) a party in default shall be served as ordered by the court; 
(a)(2)(B) a party in default for any reason other than for failure to appear shall be served with all pleadings and 
papers; 
(a)(2)(C) a party in default for any reason shall be served with notice of any hearing necessary to determine the 
amount of damages to be entered against the defaulting party; 
(a)(2)(D) a party in default for any reason shall be served with notice of entry of judgment under Rule 58A(d); and 
(a)(2)(E) pleadings asserting new or additional claims for relief against a party in default for any reason shall be 
served in the manner provided for service of summons in Rule 4. 
(a)(3) In an action begun by seizure of property, whether through arrest, attachment, garnishment or similar 
process, in which no person need be or is named as defendant, any service required to be made prior to the filing of 
an answer, claim or appearance shall be made upon the person having custody or possession of the property at the 
time of its seizure. 
(b) Service: How made and by whom. 
(b)(1) Whenever under these rules service is required or permitted to be made upon a party represented by an 
attorney, the service shall be made upon the attorney unless service upon the party is ordered by the court. Service 
upon the attorney or upon a party shall be made by delivering a copy or by mailing a copy to the last known 
address or, if no address is known, by leaving it with the clerk of the court. 
(b)(1)(A) Delivery of a copy within this rule means: Handing it to the attorney or to the party; or leaving it at the 
person's office with a clerk or person in charge thereof; or, if there is no one in charge, leaving it in a conspicuous 
place therein; or, if the office is closed or the person to be served has no office, leaving it at the person's dwelling 
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house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein; or, if 
consented to in writing by the person to be served, delivering a copy by electronic or other means. 
(b)(1)(B) Service by mail is complete upon mailing. If the paper served is notice of a hearing and if the hearing is 
scheduled 5 days or less from the date of service, service shall be by delivery or other method of actual notice. 
Service by electronic means is complete on transmission if transmission is completed during normal business hours 
at the place receiving the service; otherwise, service is complete on the next business day. 
(b)(2) Unless otherwise directed by the court: 
(b)(2)(A) an order signed by the court and required by its terms to be served or a judgment signed by the court 
shall be served by the party preparing it; 
(b)(2)(B) every other pleading or paper required by this rule to be served shall be served by the party preparing it; 
and 
(b)(2)(C) an order or judgment prepared by the court shall be served by the court. 
(c) Service: Numerous defendants. In any action in which there is an unusually large number of defendants, the 
court, upon motion or of its own initiative, may order that service of the pleadings of the defendants and replies 
thereto need not be made as between the defendants and that any cross-claim, counterclaim, or matter constituting 
an avoidance or affirmative defense contained therein shall be deemed to be denied or avoided by all other parties 
and that the filing of any such pleading and service thereof upon the plaintiff constitutes due notice of it to the 
parties. A copy of every such order shall be served upon the parties in such manner and form as the court directs. 
(d) Filing. All papers after the complaint required to be served upon a party shall be filed with the court either 
before or within a reasonable time after service. The papers shall be accompanied by a certificate of service 
showing the date and manner of service completed by the person effecting service. Rule 26(i) governs the filing of 
papers related to discovery. 
(e) Filing with the court defined. The filing of pleadings and other papers with the court as required by these 
rules shall be made by filing them with the clerk of the court, except that the judge may accept the papers, note 
thereon the filing date and forthwith transmit them to the office of the clerk. 
[Amended effective September 4, 1985; January 1, 1987; November 1, 1997; April 1, 1999; April 1, 2001; 
November 1,2002; November 1, 2003.] 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
The 1999 amendment to subdivision (b)(1)(B) does not authorize the court to conduct a hearing with less than 5 
days notice, but rather specifies the manner of service of the notice when the court otherwise has that authority. 
2001 Amendments 
Paragraph (b)(1)(A) has been changed to allow service by means other than U.S. Mail and hand delivery if 
consented to in writing by the person to be served, i.e. the attorney or the party. Electronic means include facsimile 
transmission, e-mail and other possible electronic means. 
While it is not necessary to file the written consent with the court, it would be advisable to have the consent in the 
form of a stipulation suitable for filing and to file it with the court. 
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Refs & Annos) 
*i Part XL General Provisions 
-•RULE 81. APPLICABILITY OF RULES IN GENERAL 
(a) Special Statutory Proceedings. These rules shall apply to all special statutory proceedings, except insofar as 
such rules are by their nature clearly inapplicable. Where a statute provides for procedure by reference to any 
part of the former Code of Civil Procedure, such procedure shall be in accordance with these rules. 
(b) Probate and Guardianship. These rules shall not apply to proceedings in uncontested probate and 
guardianship matters, but shall apply to all proceedings subsequent to the joinder of issue therein, including the 
enforcement of any judgment or order entered. 
(c) Application to Small Claims. These rules shall not apply to small proceeding except as expressly incorporated 
in the Small Claims Rules. 
(d) On Appeal From or Review of a Ruling or Order of an Administrative Board or Agency. These rules 
shall apply to the practice and procedure in appealing from or obtaining a review of any order, ruling or other 
action of an administrative board or agency, except insofar as the specific statutory procedure in connection with 
any such appeal or review is in conflict or inconsistent with these rules. 
(e) Application in Criminal Proceedings. These rules of procedure shall also govern in any aspect of criminal 
proceedings where there is no other applicable statute or rule, provided, that any rule so applied does not conflict 
with any statutory or constitutional requirement. 
[Amended effective November 1,2001.] 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Administrative Law and Procedure €=>657, 721, 311. 
Adoption €=>9. 
Courts €==>78 to 86, 176. 
Mental Health €=>121. 
Wills €=^222. 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 106k78 to 106k86; 106kl76; 257Akl21; 15Ak657; 15Ak721; 15Ak311; 
17k9;409k222. 
CJ.S. Adoption of Persons §§ 49 to 50, 73 to 103, 124 to 128. 
CJ.S. Courts §§7, 124 to 134. 
CJ.S. Mental Health § 130. 
CJ.S. Public Administrative Law and Procedure §§ 71, 178, 208. 
CJ.S. Wills §§500 to 502. 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
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Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure . for the United States District Courts (Refs & Annos) 
*i VII. Post-Conviction Procedures 
-•Rule 32.1. Revoking or Modifying Probation or Supervised Release 
(a) Initial Appearance. 
(1) Person In Custody. A person held in custody for violating probation or supervised release must be taken 
without unnecessary delay before a magistrate judge. 
(A) If the person is held in custody in the district where an alleged violation occurred, the initial appearance 
must be in that district. 
(B) If the person is held in custody in a district other than where an alleged violation occurred, the initial 
appearance must be in that district, or in an adjacent district if the appearance can occur more promptly there. 
(2) Upon a Summons. When a person appears in response to a summons for violating probation or supervised 
release, a magistrate judge must proceed under this rule. 
(3) Advice. The judge must inform the person of the following: 
(A) the alleged violation of probation or supervised release; 
(B) the person's right to retain counsel or to request that counsel be appointed if the person cannot obtain 
counsel; and 
(C) the person's right, if held in custody, to a preliminary hearing under Rule 32.1(b)(1). 
(4) Appearance in the District With Jurisdiction. If the person is arrested or appears in the district that has 
jurisdiction to conduct a revocation hearing- either originally or by transfer of jurisdiction~the court must 
proceed under Rule 32.1(b)-(e). 
(5) Appearance in a District Lacking Jurisdiction. If the person is arrested or appears in a district that does 
not have jurisdiction to conduct a revocation hearing, the magistrate judge must: 
(A) if the alleged violation occurred in the district of arrest, conduct a preliminary hearing under Rule 32.1(b) 
and either: 
(i) transfer the person to the district that has jurisdiction, if the judge finds probable cause to believe that a 
violation occurred; or 
(ii) dismiss the proceedings and so notify the court that has jurisdiction, if the judge finds no probable cause 
to believe that a violation occurred; or 
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(B) if the alleged violation did not occur in the district of arrest, transfer the person to the district that has 
jurisdiction if: 
(i) the government produces certified copies of the judgment, warrant, and warrant application; and 
(ii) the judge finds that the person is the same person named in the warrant. 
(6) Release or Detention. The magistrate judge may release or detain the person under 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a) 
pending further proceedings. The burden of establishing that the person will not flee or pose a danger to any 
other person or to the community rests with the person. 
(b) Revocation. 
(1) Preliminary Hearing. 
(A) In General. If a person is in custody for violating a condition of probation or supervised release, a 
magistrate judge must promptly conduct a hearing to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that 
a violation occurred. The person may waive the hearing. 
(B) Requirements. The hearing must be recorded by a court reporter or by a suitable recording device. The 
judge must give the person: 
(i) notice of the hearing and its purpose, the alleged violation, and the person's right to retain counsel or to 
request that counsel be appointed if the person cannot obtain counsel; 
(ii) an opportunity to appear at the hearing and present evidence; and 
(iii) upon request, an opportunity to question any adverse witness, unless the judge determines that the 
interest of justice does not require the witness to appear. 
(C) Referral. If the judge finds probable cause, the judge must conduct a revocation hearing. If the judge does 
not find probable cause, the judge must dismiss the proceeding. 
(2) Revocation Hearing. Unless waived by the person, the court must hold the revocation hearing within a 
reasonable time in the district having jurisdiction. The person is entitled to: 
(A) written notice of the alleged violation; 
(B) disclosure of the evidence against the person; 
(C) an opportunity to appear, present evidence, and question any adverse witness unless the court determines 
that the interest of justice does not require the witness to appear; 
(D) notice of the person's right to retain counsel or to request that counsel be appointed if the person cannot 
obtain counsel; and 
(E) an opportunity to make a statement and present any information in mitigation. 
(c) Modification. 
(1) In General. Before modifying the conditions of probation or supervised release, the court must hold a 
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hearing, at which the person has the right to counsel and an opportunity to make a statement and present any 
information in mitigation. 
(2) Exceptions. A hearing is not required if: 
(A) the person waives the hearing; or 
(B) the relief sought is favorable to the person and does not extend the term of probation or of supervised 
release; and 
(C) an attorney for the government has received notice of the relief sought, has had a reasonable opportunity to 
object, and has not done so. 
(d) Disposition of the Case. The court's disposition of the case is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3563 and § 3565 
(probation) and § 3583 (supervised release). 
(e) Producing a Statement. Rule 26.2(a)-(d) and (f) applies at a hearing under this rule. If a party fails to comply 
with a Rule 26.2 order to produce a witness's statement, the court must not consider that witness's testimony. 
CREDIT(S) 
(Added Apr. 30, 1979, eff. Dec. 1, 1980, and amended Nov. 10, 1986, Pub.L. 99-646, § 12(b), 100 Stat. 3594; 
Mar. 9, 1987, eff. Aug. 1, 1987; Apr. 25, 1989, eff. Dec. 1, 1989; Apr. 30, 1991, eff. Dec. 1, 1991; Apr. 22, 
1993, eff. Dec. 1, 1993; Apr. 29, 2002, eff. Dec. 1, 2002; Apr. 25, 2005, eff. Dec. 1, 2005.) 
PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF SUBDIVISION (A)(5)(B) 
<Effective December 1, 2006, absent contrary Congressional action, subdivision (a)(5)(B) of this rule is 
amended to read as follows:> 
<(B) if the alleged violation did not occur in the district of arrest, transfer the person to the district that has 
jurisdiction if:> 
<(i) the government produces certified copies of the judgment, warrant, and warrant application, or 
produces copies of those certified documents by reliable electronic means; and> 
<(ii) the judge fmds that the person is the same person named in the warrant> 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTES 
1979 Addition 
Rule 32.1 (a) (1). Since Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) 
, it is clear that a probationer can no longer be denied due process in reliance on the dictum in Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 
U.S. 490, 492 (1935), that probation is an "act of grace." See Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege 
Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 Harv.L.Rev. 1439 (1968); President's Commission on Law Enforcement and 
Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: Corrections 86 (1967). 
Subdivision (a) (1) requires, consistent with the holding in Scarpelli that a prompt preliminary hearing must be 
held whenever "a probationer is held in custody on the ground that he has violated a condition of his probation." 
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